


**Top Secret**



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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## CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITBURO (Elected April 1969)

**STANDING COMMITTEE**

Mao Tse-tung (78)  
Chairman, Central Committee

~~Lin Piao (64)~~  
~~Vice Chairman, Central Committee; Defense Minister~~

Chou En-lai (73)  
Premier

~~Ch'en Po-ta (66)~~  
~~Chairman, Cultural Revolution Group~~

~~K'ang Sheng (72)~~  
~~Adviser, Cultural Revolution Group; Internal Security Chief~~

**PROVINCIAL LEADERS**

Chi Teng-k'uei (40)\*  
Vice Chairman, Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Ch'en Hsi-lien (60)  
Commander, Shen-yang Military Region; Chairman, Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee

~~Li Hsueh-feng (64)\*~~  
~~Chairman, Hopeh Provincial Revolutionary Committee~~

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (59)  
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Second Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

Li Te-sheng (61)\*  
Commander, Anhwei Military District; Chairman, Anhwei Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Hsu Shih-yu (64)  
Vice Minister of Defense; Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman, Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee

Yao Wen-yuan (36)  
Vice Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Member, Cultural Revolution Group

**WIVES**

Chiang Ch'ing (56)  
Wife of Mao; First Deputy Head, Cultural Revolution Group

~~Yeh Ch'un (44)~~  
~~Wife of Lin Piao; Military Affairs Committee~~

**MILITARY LEADERS**

~~Huang Yung-sheng (62)~~  
~~Chief of Staff; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Ch'u Hui-tso (56)~~  
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Army Logistics Chief; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Li Tso-p'eng (60)~~  
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Political Commissar, Navy; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Wu Fa-hsien (58)~~  
~~Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander, Air Force; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Yeh Chien-ying (72)~~  
~~Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Committee~~

**GOVERNMENT LEADERS**

~~Hsieh Fu-chih (69)~~  
~~Public Security Minister; Chairman, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Vice Premier~~

Li Hsien-nien (66)  
Finance Minister

Wang Tung-hsing (age unknown) \*  
Public Security Vice Minister; Director, General Office, Party Central Committee

**HONORARY ELDERS**

~~Chu Te (85)~~  
~~Chairman, National People's Congress~~

~~Liu Po-ch'eng (79)~~  
~~Vice Chairman, National People's Congress; Military Affairs Committee~~

~~Tung Pi-wu (85)~~  
~~Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China~~

\*Alternate Members

Inactive

>< Purged or dead

### China: Domestic Politics, Chinese Style

Despite the outward appearance of order in China, internal stability has not been fully re-established since the purge a year ago of Lin Piao. The failure to reconstitute the ruling politburo and replace the military leaders who went down with Lin, together with the paucity of leadership turnouts and authoritative policy pronouncements, leaves the clear impression that tensions still exist among the surviving leaders. Moreover, the protracted campaign throughout the country to repudiate Lin Piao and the absence from view of an increasing number of provincial military leaders suggest that military power-holders in the provinces are under pressure--a situation that involves real risks for domestic political order.

#### A Year of Caution

In view of the magnitude of the problems it faces, the regime has unquestionably achieved some notable successes in its management of the Lin crisis. Basic social order has been maintained. The armed forces have remained stable while being urged by the regime to be subordinate to civilian party control. The trend toward moderation in domestic policies--a trend evident since 1969 and one that has wide popular support--has been even more pronounced since Lin's departure from the scene. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Peking has scored a succession of triumphs in 1972, the fruition of its decision several years ago to adopt a more pragmatic and outgoing foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the events of last autumn dramatically altered the political edifice in Peking, and the leadership has been extremely cautious in picking up the pieces. Peking's problems are most evident within the politburo itself; only 16 of the original 25 members named in 1969 are still being mentioned in the official press by name, and of these only a dozen appear to be participating in the affairs of state in a meaningful way. The delay

in reconstituting the politburo is undoubtedly associated with the question of the military's future representation on that body. While the regime wrestles with this problem, the armed forces are without a designated leader. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying has been serving as de facto defense minister but has not been formally appointed to the position.

Because Lin was officially designated Mao's successor, Peking also faces a major task of working out a new formula for succession. For several years, Peking has delayed convening the National People's Congress (NPC), the state forum for legitimizing institutional and personnel changes. Presumably this delay has stemmed from disputes within the leadership, and among these issues has been the wisdom and utility of many of the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution. The idea of a post-Mao "collective leadership" has persistently surfaced in the past year, but it seems likely that it is the composition of this collective, rather than the principle itself, that is presently at issue.

The regime's handling of the Lin affair has made it appear that the central issue in Peking is one of civilian versus military control. In fact, the issue is much more complex. Evidence--some of it antedating Lin's demise--indicates the institutional problem is a real one. Nevertheless, the leadership is deeply divided on a much wider range of policy and personnel questions, and tension between central and provincial leaders over who exercises primary authority in the provinces is a factor of growing importance. Moreover, developments during the Cultural Revolution clearly created and intensified antipathies between leaders who were identified with its excesses and those of a more moderate persuasion. It is hard to believe these antipathies have now vanished, or that they no longer cut across institutions and interest groups, including the armed forces.

(continued)


The actual facts surrounding the demise of Lin Piao in September 1971 may never be known. Although those who were purged with Lin had long career associations with him, and many, including three at the politburo level, were clearly identified with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the affair claimed high-level military victims at both ends of the political spectrum. Moreover, a campaign against ultraleftists--which began in late 1969 and probably was supported by Chou En-lai--has been muted if not terminated altogether since Lin's purge, even though all its potential victims have not been disposed of. Chiang Ching, who was deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group which directed Mao's purge of the old party apparatus, seemingly should have been the next target, but as Mao's wife she apparently is immune. Two other prominent leftists, Shanghai party leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, also continue to appear frequently in Peking.

In contrast to these inconsistencies in personnel matters, China appears at present to be traveling on a single policy track. Rationality and pragmatism seem to be the order of the day, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic areas dear to Mao's heart, such as education. There are no convincing signs that this approach is being opposed or debated at the moment.

One element that almost certainly is raising political temperatures is the protracted effort to repudiate Lin Piao. The notion that Lin, the defense minister and Mao's designated successor, could turn against his mentor has sharply eroded confidence in the country's leadership, not only among party officials but among the populace at large. [redacted]

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Some members of the leadership may in fact be exploiting the Lin affair in order to move against military leaders in the provinces. This impression has been reinforced in recent weeks by the failure of an increasing number of these leaders to make public appearances

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A move against provincial military leaders, even on a selective basis, risks jeopardizing domestic political order. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the leadership of the old party and government bureaucracies, leaving the military as the only viable instrument of control. Some efforts have been made to re-establish the civilian party structure and reassert its traditional leading role in the Chinese polity. It is clear, however, that military leaders still hold the balance of power in the party apparatus outside Peking. Thus, a move against these military leaders, particularly if it is widespread, could conceivably cause a breakdown in control, with no alternative mechanism available to fill the void.

The continuing denunciation of Lin and the accompanying "rectification" movement within the party and the army seem to have Mao's consent.

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In addition to re-establishing central authority over the provinces, Mao may see the campaign as an opportunity to settle personal scores with a number of provincial military

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leaders, primarily those whose opposition to the Red Guard movement led him to close out the Cultural Revolution before he felt he had accomplished all of his objectives.

On the other hand, Mao must recognize that his close personal identification with Lin renders him vulnerable in certain important ways.

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Mao and Chou

During 1972, Mao and Chou have seemed to work very closely on most matters. Chou has constantly been at Mao's side during the chairman's meetings with visiting state leaders, and in the course of the detailed negotiations with foreign powers, Chou has made it clear that he always defers to Mao on broad policy matters. Similarly, Mao has on several occasions publicly acknowledged his confidence in Chou.

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At this juncture, China's internal problems seem containable. At present, provincial military leaders are not faced, either collectively or individually, with the massive public attacks and orchestrated violence that were so provocative in the 1967-68 period. In the absence of such a direct

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challenge--and Peking has gone to some lengths to indicate that such a challenge is not forthcoming-- it is unlikely that they could or would unite to defy the authority of the chairman directly. This seems particularly to be the case in the absence of a strong and authoritative leader for such a move.

It is difficult to cast Chou in such a role. His concern for the loyalty of the armed forces to the political system is surely as great as his concern for the cohesion of the military establishment, and on both grounds he is likely to attempt to "limit the damage" rather than place himself at the head of a group determined to end the selective purge of the military. Indeed, Chou probably supports the removal of certain provincial military leaders. The premier seems to have the endorsement of the chairman for much of his domestic program as well as for his foreign policy, and this is an asset Chou will not cast away lightly. Thus, a Mao-Chou split seems highly improbable at the present time.

Mao's motives in the present situation are equally complicated. Certainly vindictiveness and a desire to settle old scores--particularly those arising from the equivocal role of many military leaders in the Cultural Revolution--play a major part in the current moves against the provincial military. The explicit attempts, however, to reassure the military that it is not about to suffer a thoroughgoing "rectification," coupled with continued emphasis on conservative and pragmatic policies at home as well as abroad, seem to indicate that the offensive is at this point a limited one. Like Chou, Mao seems intent for the moment to limit the damage. His objective could well be to establish a better balance between competing leftist and conservative forces--and hence further increase his own freedom of maneuver--by whittling away at the predominantly conservative military leaders in the provinces through a process of linking them, however tenuously, to the Lin "plot."

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